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Cats are nice        because cats never overlap
David Lewis Parts of Classes p 
Abstract
In this paper we discuss two approaches to adverbial quantication the socalled bound variable approach
and the situationbased approach and we address the suggestion that has been made in the literature that
the latter reduces to the former as soon as the underlying structure of situations has been characterized at
the required level of detail We will rst show what constraints on situation structures are needed in order for
the situationbased approach to produce the results of the bound variable approach Then we will argue that
the required constraints are at odds with the philosophy underlying the situation based approach This result
points at a principled dierence between the two approaches and this theoretical dierence can be used as a
heuristic to nd empirical support for any of the two approaches
AMS Subject Classication  	
B S	 K	
Keywords  Phrases Dynamic Semantics Situation Theory Mereology
Note The research for this paper was supported by the ESPRIT Basic Research project  DYANA and
the LRE Project 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  Introduction
In Lewis  examples are discussed of the form
	
 Sometimes  usually  always if a Dutchman smells a bargain he goes for it
Lewis points out that the quantifying adverbs sometimes  usually  always in fact quantify over the
cases that verify the restrictive clause The cases that verify the restriction a Dutchman smells a
bargain are conceived of as pairs consisting of a Dutchman and a bargain he smells and the respective
quantiers quantify over these cases If the adverb is sometimes  the sentence says that some pairs
consisting of a Dutchman and a bargain he smells are pairs of which the rst element purchases the
second If always is the head the sentence tells us that every pair of a Dutchman and a reeking
bargain stands in the purchase relation With usually  it can be stated that most such pairs stand in
this relation Put more generally adverbs of quantication are taken to quantify over the sequences
of individuals satisfying the conditions imposed upon the values of indenite noun phrases in the
restrictions of the adverbs
With Lewis approach to adverbial quantication a whole family of analyses can be associated
	among which eg Heim  Root  Kadmon  Groenendijk and Stokhof b Chierchia
 Dekker 
 and in the sequel this family of analyses will be referred to as the Bound Variable
Approach 	BVA Free Variable Approach would do equally well for that matter
 Another alterna
tive family of analyses can be referred to as Situationbased approach 	henceforth SbA
 According
to analyses of this kind the domains of adverbial quantication consist of the minimal situations
which support the adverbs restrictions 	where the notion of a situation must be understood in the
 Introduction 
sense of Kratzer 
 Thus the example above expresses quantication over minimal situations
in which a Dutchman smells a bargain and it can be used to state that some  most  all such situa
tions are 	part of
 situations in which the Dutchman goes for the bargain Analyses of this kind can
be found in among others Berman  Chierchia  Heim  van Eijck and de Vries 
de Swart  Fintel 
A major problem of or challenge for the SbA is that it doesnt give any account of the inferential
properties of adverbially quantied srtuctures as long as it does not specify what the underlying
structure of situations is For instance what the SbA as it is often presented fails to account for is
that many people judge 	
 a logical consequence of 	

	
 If a cat falls down it always lands on its feet
	
 Every cat who falls down lands on its feet
However if the structure of situations underlying the SbA is not constrained in any way then the
adverbially quantied construction may come out true and the corresponding adnominally quantied
construction false For even if there are many cats which fall down and which do not land on their
feet there may fail to be minimal situations in which a cat falls down and hence the adverbial
quantication may be vacuous Another example of an 	unwanted
 nonvalidity can be found in
	
 If a kid has had primary education in Amsterdam it never knows the national anthem
	
 No kid who has had primary eduction in Amsterdam knows the national anthem
Example 	
 is false if it many kids who have had primary education perfectly well know the national
anthem Still the adverbially quantied statement may betriviallytrue because there happen to
be no minimal situations in which a kid has had primary education in Amsterdam
It will be clear that for the discussed inferences not to come out valid we have to bring up possi
ble structures of situations which although not excluded beforehand can be conceived to be rather
deviant from some intuitive conception of situations and hence should not be taken into con
sideration As a matter of fact situationbased analyses have often been backed up by such calls
on intuitions eg that if there is a woman living with a cat then there is a minimal situation
in which only this woman only lives with only this cat In general the literature on the subject
is full of such suggestions about a casy or caselike appearance of minimal situations 	cf eg
Chierchia  Heim  Lappin and Francez 

The intention of this paper is to esh out the suggested impression of a casyness of the SbA on
a formal level The felt suggestion is that the SbA and the BVA produce the same results as soon
as the structure of situations underlying the SbA has been suciently characterized at the required
level of detail To substantiate this we will sort out what a situation structure must be like in order
to make it behave like a structure of cases However when this is achieved it will appear that the
constraints which have to be imposed on the situation structures are at odds with their background
philosophy Thus we nd there to be a principled dierence between the two approaches The two
are bound to make dierent empirical predictions
For this reason the paper concludes with an investigation of the kinds of cases where the two
approaches work out dierently It is then argued that in these cases in fact none of the two is really
adequate Instead the inspected data are taken to motivate a conception of the notion of a situation
as that of an eventuality 	as adopted in among others Davidson Link Bach Krifka
 Following
Chierchia  and recently Jager  Milward  a combined dynamic and situation or
eventualitybased approach is eventually argued for

 Bound Variable Approach 
 Bound Variable Approach
According to the BVA adverbs of quantication like always sometimes never usually       are
taken to quantify over variable assignments In Lewis it is said that a sentence like 	

	
 ADVERB  if a farmer owns a donkey he beats it
must be taken in the logicians idiom as something which sounds like ADVERB if some x is a
farmer some y a donkey and x owns y then x beats y and this in its turns has to be analyzed
as involving quantication over possible assignments of values to the variables x and y Under this
analysis example 	
 is true if all assignments of values to the variables x and y under which the value
of x is a farmer who beats a donkey which is the value of y are assignments under which the value of
x beats the value of y
Although the analysis of many examples can be stated in terms of total assignment the adverbials
quantiers in general must be taken to quantify over certain alternatives of variable assignments
this in view of adverbs such as often twice more then once and these alternatives can be best
viewed as partial variable assignments 	cf eg Dekker 
 Relative to a domain E of individuals
and subsetsX of the set V of variables the relevant domains of quantication can be dened as follows
Denition  For nite X   V  DoQ
X
BVA
 E
X
Assuming some minimal language of predicate logic without individual constants and identity we can
dene an interpretation function which generates the appropriate subsets of the domains of adverbial
quantication The interpretation dened below is a dynamic predicate logical version of Heims
le change semantics This semantics is dynamic since it can be seen as changing the assignment
parameter In general relative to a partial variable assignment i the interpretation of a formula yields
a set of 	possibly alternative
 variable assignments as possible results For instance the interpretation
of a conjunction  relative to i is the set of assignments which are a possible result of interpreting
 relative to an assignment which is a possible result from interpreting  relative to i This encodes
the dynamic idea that the interpretation of  involves the successive interpretation of  and 
in that order 	cf Groenendijk and Stokhof a

The specic interpretation function used here also incorporates a notion of felicity in the sense of
Heim  and this function is therefore partial It renders the interpretation of an atomic formula
Rx
 
      x
n
undened relative to a partial assignment i i i itself is undened for any of the variables
x
 
      x
n
 the interpretation of an existentially quantied formula x is undened relative to partial
assignment i i i itself is dened for x or if  is undened for an extension of i to x A negation 
is undened relative to i i  is and a conjunction    is undened relative to i i  is or if 
is undened for any of the assignments which result from interpreting  relative to i Throughout
we will assume denedness which by the way can be fully characterized syntactically 	For relevant
discussion cf Dekker 

Now let M  hEF i be an ordinary rst order model let i j k be partial variable assignments
and let i 
x
k say that k extends i with an assignment to x Then the interpretation 
Mi
of 
relative to M and i 	if dened at all
 is specied as follows
Denition  Dynamic Semantics
Rx
 
      x
n

Mi
 fj j i  j  hi	x
 

        i	x
n

i
 
F
M
	R
g

Mi
 fj j i  j  
Mi
 g
x
Mi
 fj j k i 
x
k  j
 

Mk
g
  
Mi
 fj j k k
 

Mi
 j
 

Mk
g
A	
	

Mi
 fj j i  j  A	fj j j
 

Mi
g
	fj j 
Mj
 g
g
 Situation Theory 
where A is the usual binary interpretation associated with adverb A
Let us quickly see what the above denition amounts to
	
 Always if a Dutchman smells a bargain he goes for it
A	x	Dx  y	By  Sxy


	Gxy

The sentence is satised in M relative to an assigment i i Gxy is satised in M relative to all
extensions j of i in x	Dxy	By Sxy


Mi
 This is the case i under every assignment of values
d and d

to x and y we nd that if d is a Dutchman d

a bargain and if d smells d

 then d goes for
d


Assuming our adverbial quantiers to observe the constraints of conservativity and quantity quanti
cation over the domains of partial variable assignments can be seen to amount to quantication over
domains consisting of Lewisian cases ie tuples of individuals For for nite X   V and n  jX j
Observation  there is a bijection  from DoQ
X
BVA
to E
n
Proof Let jX j  n and let x
 
       x
n
be an enumeration of X  Then  can be dened such that
for i
 
DoQ
X
BVA
 	i
  hi	x
 

        i	x
n

i 	
 
E
n

 Its inverse 
 
is given by 
 
	hd
 
        d
n
i
 
fhx
i
 d
i
i j i  ng End of Proof
Using the mentioned constraints we nd that
A	fj j j
 

Mi
g
	fj j 
Mj
 g
 i 	by conservativity

A	fj j j
 

Mi
g
	fj j j
 

Mi
and 
Mj
 g
 i 	by quantity

A	f	j
 j j
 

Mi
g
	f	j
 j j
 

Mi
and 
Mj
 g

In fact this is what had been assumed in the rst place Quantication over assignments does not
seem to make good sense unless it boils down to quantication over 	constructions out of
 individuals
in the real world Since moreover for any j
 

Mi
 in the present system of interpretation we nd
that j is an extension of i with a set of variables specic for  viz the set of variables introduced
by  we nd 	by quantity again
 that adverbial quantication is in eect over the tuples of values
of variables introduced by the restriction of the adverb 	For those who are interested it may be
added that it is straightforward to extend the analysis to asymmetric and adnominal quantication
cf Dekker 

As a matter of fact Lewisian adverbial quantiers can more in general be taken to range over tuples
consisting of all kinds of entities Let us assume we have a manysorted predicate logic that  is
a set of sorts and for 
 
  D

the domain of entities of sort  Then the intended domains of
quantication can be more generally characterized as
	
 DoQ

BVA
 fD

 
      D

n
j 
 
        
n
 
  n
 
Ng
Thus we can have all the kinds of sorts one may want to quantify over individuals possible worlds
events time intervals pigeon holes and situations  Trivially then the BVA subsumes the SbA
 Situation Theory
According to several proposals which t in the SbA adverbs of quantication quantify over situations
of the type of Angelika Kratzers situation theory In this section we rst investigate to some extent
the specic kind of structures that have been proposed Kratzers structures of situations can be
dened as follows
 Situation Theory 
Denition  Situation structures K  hSvi consists of a nonempty set of possible situations
S possibly with a subset of individuals A 	 S and a partwhole relation v which partially orders
S 	So v is reexive transitive and antisymmetric
 Every situation s is assumed to be part of a
unique biggest situation w
s
 called ss possible world We will say that two situations s and s

overlap
s O s

 i they have a common 	nonempty
 part ie i there is a 	nonempty
 s

such that s

v s
and s

v s

 If s

v s and s

 s we will say that s

is a proper part of s s

  s A situation is an
atom i it has no proper parts
It is generally assumed that structures of situations 	or events
 are closed under sums
Denition  Summation For any nonempty set of situations P  s is a sum of P i every s

in
P is part of s and if for any s

 every s

in P is part of s

 then s is part of s

 A structure hSvi
is closed under sums i every subset P of S has a sum
By the denition of sums and by antisymmetry it follows that if a set of situations P has a sum then
it has a unique sum
L
P  As is common practice we will write s 
 s

for the sum
L
fs s

g of two
situations s and s


There is a typical consequence of assuming closure under sums which sometimes goes unnoticed
viz that it entails that there exists one world only viz
L
S For the world w
ss
 
of the sum of s and
s

must be the 	one and only
 world of both s and s

 So if any two situations have a sum they are part
of the same world and if all sets of situations have a sum there exists only one world As a matter
of fact for the purposes of this paper this is not an unwanted consequence because our purposes are
entirely extensional Notice that if on later extensions we do want to incorporate modality then
either we have to restrict the domain of summation to sets of situations from one and the same world
as probably should be in accordance with Kratzers conception of the structure of situations or we
must allow for the possibility that situations are entities which can be part of dierent worlds 	as in
for instance Landman  Bartsch 

In the literature on situations events and plurals sums are often conceived of as being built up from
their parts This idea can be stated by means of the following formal constraint
Denition 	 Generation If for all s

v s s

O t then s v t
This constraint subtly says that two situations which are composed of the same parts are identical
That is if a structure satises generation then
Observation  If s is not itself an atom then s 
L
fs

j s

  sg
Proof By  for all s

v s there is an s

in fs

j s

  sg such that s

O s

 so by transitivity and the
denition of
L
 s

O
L
fs

j s

  sg By generation we then nd that s v
L
fs

j s

  sg Conversely
all s

in fs

j s

  sg are part of s so by the denition of
L
we nd that
L
fs

j s

  sg v s
Antisymmetry then gives us that s 
L
fs

j s

  sg End of proof Here we see that generation
indeed tell us that every nonatomic situation equals the sum of its 	proper!
 parts the same parts
generate the same sums
The notion of generation gets a bit more concrete in case we are dealing with atomic structures
A structure of situations is called atomic i every situation has an atomic part Let us use A	s
 to
indicate that s is an atom Then the generation constraint gives us that for atomic hSvi
 Situation Theory 
Observation  If fa v s j A	a
g   fb v t j A	b
g then s v t
Proof Since by the assumption of atomicity every part of s has an atomic part which is also an
	atomic
 part of t it follows that every part of s overlaps with t Hence by generation s is part of
t End of proof Now we see that in atomic structures which satisfy generation the part of relation
between sums can be dened in terms of their atomic parts Notice however that our notion of
generation also applies to nonatomic structures
Generation can also be dened in a negative way By contraposition the constraint tells us that
if s is not a part of t then s has a part which does not overlap with t Upon this formulation the
constraint can be easily seen to entail Krifkas constraint called witness element Krifkas constraint
requires that if t   s 	and hence s v t
 then s has a part which has no overlap with t In a sloganlike
way upon this reformulation the constraint says that dierent sums are made up of dierent parts
Another notion often employed with respect to algebraic structures of the kind discussed here is that
of freedom 	We may have to note that the terms freedom and generation as they are used here
correspond to those in Landman  L"nning  but that what we call generation is called
freedom in van Benthem 
 For instance if we take the sum of two atoms this is required not
to force along another atom As Kai von Fintel has put it #	      
 there is a situation that contains
all and only my left earlobe the square root of  and Brutus stabbing Caesar$ Fintel  P 
	nemphasismine PD
 The general idea is that any part of the sum of any set of situations P is made
up of parts of the elements of P  This can be formulated as follows
Denition 
 Freedom Let P be any nonempty set of situations Then if s v
L
P  then there
is an s

in P such that s O s

By transitivity if s v
L
P  then all parts of s are required to overlap an element in P  If we apply
this contraint to a temporal structure it as it were says that the sum of yesterday and tomorrow is
required not to include today Among other things freedom ensures that for any sets X and Y of
atoms in S that
Observation  If
L
X v
L
Y  then X   Y 
Proof Assume
L
X v
L
Y  and take any s
 
X  Then s v
L
X v
L
Y  By freedom s

 
Y 
s O s

 and since s and s

are atoms this must be s itself Hence s
 
Y  End of proof So freedom in a
sense says that the same sums have the same parts or equivalently that dierent parts make dierent
sums From this constraint also the following principle follows a generalization of Krifkas constraint
labeled partition Let for any nonempty set of situations X  P 	X
 be the closure fs

v s j s
 
Xg
of X under the part of relation Under the assumption of freedom then for nonempty X 
Observation 	 s v
L
X i there is a subset Y   P 	X
 s 
L
Y 
Proof Righttoleft Clearly if s is the sum of parts of elements of X then s is part of the sum of X 
Lefttoright Let Y  fs

v s j s

 s

v s

g Clearly
L
Y v s Now take any s

v s 	v
L
X
 By
freedom s

overlaps with an element of X  so s

has a part s

which is part of an element of X  By
the denition of Y  s

 
Y  and since s

O s

 s

O
L
Y  Since this holds for any s

v s generation
 Situationbased Approach 
gives s v
L
Y  and antisymmetry s 
L
Y  End of Proof Generation and freedom are quite strong
constraints indeed They make our structure collapse into a bottomless complementary lattice For
with generation and freedom as long as s is not part of t then t has a proper complement in s dened
as s n t 
L
fs

v s j s

O tg
Now we have considered possible structures of situations to some extent we may turn to their use in
an analysis of adverbial quantication In the remainder of this paper we will assume our structures
to be free and closed under summation We do not 	need to
 impose the constraint of generation
This means that the structures we use just observe the laws of mereology as they have originally been
proposed by Stanislaw Le%sniewski at the beginning of this century and as simplied in among others
Tarski 
 
Lewis takes mereology to be #perfectly understood unproblematic and certain$ cf
Lewis  p 
 Situationbased Approach
Let us now turn to a rudimentary 	Kratzerian
 situation semantics The basic idea of the SbA is that
adverbs of quantication quantify over the minimal situations which satisfy the restriction of the
adverb According to this idea a sentence Usually if a cat falls down it lands on its feet is analyzed
as stating that most minimal situations in which a cat falls down have an extension where you nd
that the cat lands on its feet In this section we will present a most simple formal elaboration of this
idea in the form of a toy situation semantics for the predicate logical language employed above
We will dene a semantics for the language of predicate logic according to which formulas are
interpreted as persistent sets of verifying situations 	A persistent set of situations P is a set closed
of under the has as partrelation if s
 
P and s v s

 then s

 
P 
 This is as in Kratzer 
but for the fact that we restrict attention to situations which are part of one world not situations
from dierent possible worlds As a consequence false formulas are interpreted as the empty set of
situations We furthermore make a couple of simplifying assumptions
As we have seen above indenites or existential quantiers are the main source of structure in the
domains of adverbial quantication according to the BVA Now although much attention on this topic
in the literature has been devoted to anaphoric relationships between such terms in the restriction of
a quantifying adverb and pronouns in its nuclear scope we will skip this matter in the sequel The
reason is that rst the interpretation of pronouns in a situationbased framework is not a settled
issue and second it is not relevant for our immediate concerns Here we are primarily concerned
with 	comparing
 the structures of the domains of adverbial quantication induced by clauses in the
restriction of the adverb For this reason we can make the simplifying assumption that no free variable
must be conceived of as anaphorically related to any preceding existential quantier andin terms
of the dynamic semanticsthat every syntactically free variable is also semantically free
In the following denition the 	persistent
 interpretation of atomic formulas employs a notation
s

j
Mg
At to be understood as saying that s

satises At relative to M and g which will be the case
if At denotes a part of s

 An atomic formula will be taken to denote a situation i it is true For
the moment it is left unspecied how this denotation comes about For as we will see how we think
about this relation relates to how we want the domains of quantication to be individuated The
clauses dealing with negation existential quantication conjunction and adverbial quantication are
relatively simple Interpretation is dened relative to ordinary 	total
 variable assignments and to a
model like the one we used in the BVA In the clause for adverbially quantied statements we let for
any set of situations P  P
m
indicate the set of minimal elements of P  ie fs
 
P j s

 
P  s

  sg
 
A mereology can be based on a primitive partwhole relationship and a notion of fusion according to which something
is a fusion of some things i i it has all of them as parts and ii each of its parts overlaps with one of them The only
further stipulations are that the partwhole relationship is transitive that fusion is idempotent x 
L
fxg and that
there exists a unique fusion of any number of things Upon these stipulations a mereological structure can be seen to
be a partial order so also re	exive and antisymmetric and free that it is complete is obvious
	 An Sbway of Getting BVAresults 
Denition  Situation Semantics
hhRx
 
      x
n
ii
Mg
 fs j s j
Mg
Rx
 
      x
n
g
hhii
Mg
 fs j hhii
Mg
 g
hhxii
Mg

S
dE
hhii
Mgxd
hh  ii
Mg
 hhii
Mg
 hhii
Mg
hhA	
	
ii
Mg
 fs j A	fs

j s

 
hhii
m
Mg
g
	fs

j s

 
hhii
Mg
g
g
In order to keep matters manageable we have adopted a most simple notion of negation If  is true
then  denotes the empty set of situations and if  is false  denotes the full set Thus the
interpretation of  is deprived of any particular content 	But it is trivially persistent
 This is not
as it generally should be but the issue is too involved to be tackled here 	see Kratzer  p 
for some relevant discussion
 The same holds mutatis mutandis for the sets of situations described by
adverbially quantied statements Truthconditionally however they quantify over minimal situations
of certain kinds As can be seen from the denition for a sentence If a cat falls down it always
rains to be true it must rain in all minimal situations in which a cat falls down That is to say for
A	x	Cx  Fx

	R
 to be true all minimal situations s which verify x	Cx  Fx
 must be such that
s veries R
In the literature on the subject one can nd many suggestions about how situation structures are
individuated and this is of course relevant for the question how quantication over situations relates
to quantication over cases For instance when Lappin and Francez in a recent paper talk about the
set of minimal situations in the interpretation of A man owns a donkey  they have it that #When this
set denes the range of the adverbial quantier the quantier eectively quanties over pairs which
consist of a man and a donkey that he owns$ 	Lappin and Francez  p &
 Heim 
holds more in general that #By restricting the QAdverbs range to situations that are minimal we
have made sure that there are always just as many situations in this range as there are ntuples of
the relevant sort$ 	p 
 Chierchia more tentatively suggests that we might have to conclude that
#	      
 occasions have to be 	      
 structured 	      
 perhaps as ne grained as assignments to sequences
of variables which is of course the idea that DRT is built on$ Chierchia  p  Now it may be
conceded that more or less intuitive assumptions about how structures of situations individuate are at
stake here but it is typical that they are never backed up by any formal constraints which guarantee
that situations individuate thus As Kadmon already had put it # Saying something about situations
or events is not in itself a solution unless you specify how the situationsevents are individuated and
how that relates to the data you are trying to account for$ Kadmon  p 
For this reason it is our objective to clarify this matter by investigating how the situation based
domains of quantication can be constrained so as to mimic domains of BVAcases Thus we may
see what is required to get the suggested eects and more importantly whether it is at all desirable
to get these eects
 An Sbway of Getting BVAresults
In order to approximate the BVA to adverbial quantication the SbA structure of situations has to be
constrained further If a situation semantics is appropriate for an analysis of quantifying adverbs along
the above lines and if it has to get us the BVAresults it must always assign sentences propositions
	sets of situations
 with two properties which are called minimality and distinctness
Adverbs crucially refer to the minimal situations in the propositions 	sets of situations
 which are
expressed by the sentences they range over 	minimality cf Berman  Heim  and von Fintel
 among others
 Moreover the number of minimal situations supporting the truth of a sentence
must be equal to or approach the number of cases verifying it 	distinctness cf eg Heim 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the remarks on pp &
 Clearly we dont get these properties for free For instance even if we
have a Kratzerian vpersistent proposition 	set of situations
 this does not mean that the set has
smallest or minimal velementsAnd nobody sofar has excluded that a minimal situation in which
for instance Chris smells a bargain is also a minimal situation in which say cat Possum lands on its
feet Therefore we will now set ourselves the task of constraining the situation structure to get the
required eects
It may have to be said from the outset that we will assume the domains of adverbial quantication
to be delineated by formulas which are free of negations and adverbial quantiers Like we said
above it is a relatively complicated issue to give a compositional account of the situational content
of negations and adverbially quantied expressions and in order not to distract too much from the
main issue viz the description of caselike situations with existentially quantied formulas we leave
the matter for further study So henceforth we will be dealing with formulas built up from atomic
formulas using existential quantication and conjunction only
First minimality has to be guaranteed for the propositions expressed by true atomic formulas Such
propositions must have a minimal element and this minimal element must be unique an atomic
formula can at most describe one case The rst part of the story can be captured by associating
any true atomic formula At with a particular fact in S which we will assume to be determined by a
derived interpretation function F
M
S

Denition  Uniqueness Rx
 
      x
n
denotes at most one situation relative to M and g
i hg	x
 

        g	x
n

i
 
F
M
	R
 then Rx
 
      x
n
denotes a situation relative to M and g which is given
by F
M
S
	R
	hg	x
 

        g	x
n

i

In other words F
M
S
is an interpretation function for the relational constants of our language which
assigns to every nary constant a partial function from ntuples of individuals to situations The
function is 	partly
 determined by our earlier models to the eect that F
M
S
	R
 is dened for a
certain tuple of individuals i the tuple of individuals is in the extension of R according to F
M

The need of uniqueness in the present context must be obvious If we consider a model in which
there is only one man d then a formula xMx will be BVAveried by one case viz d itself In that
case it is uniqueness that makes sure there is also 	exactly
 one minimal situation which SbAsatises
xMx
With uniqueness we nd that if Rx
 
      x
n
is true inM under g then hhRx
 
      x
n
ii
Mg
is a persistent
proposition p  fs

j s  s

g for some unique minimal situation s Using summation we also know
that if P and Q are persistent propositions with sets of minimal elements P
m
and Q
m
 then P Q is
the persistent vclosure of f	p


 q


 j p

 
P
m
and q

 
Q
m
g Summation does not by itself guarantee
that such a set has minimal elements

However if we are dealing with persistent propositions which
have nonoverlapping minimal situations 	relativized atoms
 then minimality is preserved under
intersection Such relativized atoms are given to us by the constraint to be discussed next
The second requirement we have to impose on our situationtheoretic models is called distinctness
Dierent atomic formulas must be guaranteed to be associated with distinct atoms In short it is
required that

For instance let for a natural number n X
n
be the set of positive integers n
 
 
n plus the negative even integers
  n
 
 
n and X
n
the set of negative integers n
 
 
n plus the positive even integers   n
 
 
n let P be the
set of sets X
n
for natural numbers n Q the set of sets X
m
for natural numbers m let P

and Q

be the closure of P
and Q under supersets of integers and let v be  Then P

is a persistent set with minimal elements P  similarly for
Q

and Q However the intersection of the two has no minimal elements
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Denition  Distinctness
If F
M
S
	R
	hd
 
        d
n
i
 O F
M
S
	T 
	hd
n 
       d
nm
 i
 then n  m R  T and d
 
 d
n 
        and
d
n
 d
nm
Distinct atomic propositions are required to be satised by distinct minimal siutations where distinct
means nonoverlapping not merely being dierent Suppose there are two men in our model M  say
d and d

 that is there are two cases satisfying the clause There is a man xMx Distinctness tells
us in that case that there are also two minimal situations in hhxMxii
M
 one in which d is a man
another in which d

is a man Freedom guarantees that distinctness is preserved under conjunction
For instance consider a model in which two dierent d and d

are men who walk so we have two
cases BVAsatisfying x	Mx  Wx
 By uniqueness and distinctness we then have minimal and
nonoverlapping situations hhMxii
gxd
 hhMxii
gxd
 

 hhWxii
gxd
 hhWxii
gxd
 

 	indicated as Md
Md

 Wd and Wd

 respectively
 By summation we know there are at most two minimal situations
satisfying x	MxWx
 viz Md
Wd and Md


Wd

 and by distinctness and freedom Md
Wd
and Md


Wd

are known to be distinct too So we nd there to be two minimal SbAsituations
corresponding to our two BVAwalking men
Notice that it would not be enough to require atomic formulas to be satised by dierent  and not
merely distinct  minimal situations For in that case we could have four situations s s

 s

and s

such that s
 s

is a minimal situation in which d is a man s


 s

one in which d

is a man s


 s

one in which d walks and s


 s one in which d

walks In that case we would have two walking
men 	two cases BVAverifying the clause A man walks
 but only one corresponding situation For
if 	Md 
 Wd
  		s 
 s


 
 	s


 s



 it equals 		s


 s


 
 	s


 s

 which is supposed to be
	Md


Wd



We are now in a position to show that minimality is preserved under conjunction of propositions which
have distinct minimal situations Let P
m
 and Q
m
be the minimal situations of persistent propositions
P and Q respectively and assume no two of these minimal situations overlap Then for any p
 
P
m

q
 
Q
m

Observation 
 either p or q is in 	P Q

m
 or 	p
 q
 is in 	P Q

m

Proof For any r
 
	P  Q
 there are minimal p
 
P
m
and q
 
Q
m
such that 	p 
 q
 v r Also for
p
 
P
m
and q
 
Q
m
 by persistence 	p
 q

 
	P  Q
 Now suppose p
 q is not a minimal situation
in P Q Then there are p

 
P
m
and q

 
Q
m
such that p


 q

  p
 q By distinctness 	p

O p
 or
	q

O q
 Assume the second Since q

v 	p


 q


 v 	p
 q
 freedom gives us that q

overlaps p or q
By assumption 	q

O q
 so q

O p whence 	distinctness
 q

 p so q

 p
 
	P Q

m
 Analogously
we nd that p

 q
 
	P Q

m
if 	p

O p
 End of proof More in particular we nd that for some
set fAt
c
j c
 
Cg of atomic formulas the conjunction
V
cC
At
c
denotes a proposition with a smallest
element which is the sum of the smallest elements in the denotation of the individual atomic formulas
Let for c
 
C hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 s
m
c
 then hh
V
cC
At
c
ii
m
Mh

L
cC
s
m
c

In order to get our intended result we are in need of one more constraint one on the class of formulas
to be considered The constraint requires that if any variable is quantied over in the restrictrion 
of an adverb then something unique is predicated of it
Denition  Unique Predication for any variable x quantied over in  there is an atom
Rx
 
      x
n
in  such that x  x
i
 and for all atoms Ry
 
      y
n
in  y
i
 x
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It may appear as if this constraint is needed to solve the indistinguishable participants 	the car
dinality problem
 but it is not really In the set up sofar if cardinal c as a matter of fact meets
cardinal c

 and if by for instance a symmetry postulate on the predicate meet  we nd that then c

also meets c then distinctness still requires there to be two dierent minimal situations verifying the
two meetings 	Clearly this may conict with intuition and we will therefore return to issues like this
in due course

To see what our unique predication constraint must achieve suppose there are two G

s d and d


Then there are four cases verifying the formula xGx  yGy according to the BVA viz 	i
 hd di
	ii
 hd d

i 	iii
 hd

 di and 	iv
 hd

 d

i However in a situationbased framework we nd that only
two minimal situations correspond to these four cases viz F
M
S
	G
	d
 and F
M
S
	G
	d


 Using Xx
again to indicate the situation F
M
S
	X
	x
 it is easily seen that Gd 	 	Gd
Gd

 corresponds to 	i

that Gd

	 	Gd


Gd



 corresponds to 	iv
 and that 	Gd
Gd


  	Gd


Gd
 which corresponds
to both 	ii
 and 	iii
 has both Gd and Gd

as a proper part
The unique predication constraint rules out this case Consider an extension of the above formula
which does satisfy the constraint an extension with for instance predications Fx of x and Hy of y
as in x	Fx  Gx
  y	Gy Hy
 Let us furthermore assume that d and d

in fact are F and H 
The four cases above then correspond to the following four minimal situations 	i

L
fFdGdHdg
	ii

L
fFdGdGd

 Hd

g 	iii

L
fFd

 Gd

 GdHdg 	iv

L
fFd

 Gd

 Hd

g By distinctness and
freedom these are four dierent situations as required
Notice that if something uniquely is predicated of a variable x in a conjunction
V
cC
At
c
of atomic
formulas and if for two assignments h and h

 h	x
  h

	x
 then there is a minimal situation
hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 
for some c
 
C which is not in fhhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
j c
 
Cg For let At
c
be the unique predication
of x and compare for any c

 
C hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 
and hhAt
c
 
ii
m
Mh
 If they are the same then by
distinctness At
c
and At
c
 
must be composed with the same relational constant and by unique
predication the variable x occupies the same distinguished position in At
c
and At
c
 
 But this cannot
be since h	x
  h

	x
 so hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 
is not equal to hhAt

c
ii
m
Mh
by distinctness
It is nally time to come to our main result Let  be a formula constructed from atoms  and 
which satises the unique predication constraint furthermore assume  is BVAdened for assignment
i nally assume our structure to observe the constraints of summation and freedom and our model
the constraints of uniqueness and distinctness Then for g any total extension of i
Observation  there is a bijection  from 
Mi
to hhii
m
Mg
Proof First observe that  has a 	BVA and SbAequivalent
 quantied normal form qnf which can
be obtained by preposing all existential quantiers in  and which existentially quanties over a 	nite

set of variables in the conjunction of a 	nite
 set of atomic formulas qnf  x
 
      x
n
V
cC
At
c

with x
 
      x
n
the variables quantied over in  and fAt
c
j c
 
Cg the set of atomic formulas in  The
function  from 
Mi
to hhii
m
Mg
then can be dened such that for j
 

Mi
 	j
 
L
cC
hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh

with h an arbitrary total extension of j Now it remains to be shown that for any j in 
Mi
 	a

	j

 
hhii
m
Mg
 and that for any s in hhii
m
Mg
 	b
 there is 	c
 a unique assignment j in 
Mi
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that 	j
  s
	a
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 
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 Then i 
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 
x
n
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 
At
c

Mj
for
all c
 
C Thus for any c
 
C there is an atom s
m
c
in hhAt
c
ii
Mh
 and 	j
 
L
cC
s
m
c
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smallest s in hh
V
c
 
C
At
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ii
Mh
 Now suppose for some dierent h

 which at most diers from h
with respect to the values of x
 
       x
n
 that for all c
 
C hhAt
c
ii
Mh
is not empty Using unique
predication and distinctness there is a minimal situation hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 
for some c
 
C which is not in
fhhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
j c
 
Cg By distinctness and freedom we nd that
L
cC
hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh
 
 
L
cC
hhAt
c
ii
m
Mh

Therefore 	j
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m
c
is also a smallest situation in hhx
 
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n
V
c
 
C
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c
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Mg
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 So for some sequence of individuals d
 
        d
n
 there is a total assignment
h 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 
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 
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 But then we nd for partial
assignment j  i  fhx
i
 d
i
i j  	 i  ng that j
 
At
c

Mj
for any c
 
C so j
 

Mi
 and 	j
  s
	c
 Now let j j

 

Mi
 j  j

 and g and g

total extensions of j and j

respectively Then there
is at least one variable x such that j	x
  j

	x
 and such that x is existentially quantied over in 
By unique predication and distinctness there is an atomic formula Rx
 
      x
n
in  such that x
i
 x
and such that hhRx
 
      x
n
ii
m
Mg
is not in fhhAt
c
ii
Mg
 
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 
Cg So fhhAt
c
ii
Mg
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 
j
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 and by freedom and distinctness 	j
 
L
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Mg

L
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hhAt
c
ii
Mg
 
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

 End of
proof
Again restricting ourselves to the quantiers that satisfy the constraints of conservativity and quantity
and under the conditions specied above the latest result tells us that quantication over 	minimal

situations amounts to quantication over 	partial
 assignments As we have seen quantication over
	partial
 assignments in its turn amounts to quantication over cases So also quantication over
	minimal
 situations does After a long road we are home
Before we conclude this section one more observation is in order Apparently for a given language and
model we can restrict attention to a substructure of situations which is the sum closure of the set of
denotations of atomic formulas 	atoms
 Clearly the resulting describable structure is atomic free
and generated quite a delineated structure indeed However the present general setting shows that
we are not forced to such an ontologically restricted universe The above results can also be obtained
in wider structures that is in less restricted extensions of describable structures Without any danger
of losing our main result there may happen to be situations below the describable structure 	parts
of atoms
 or in between it 	sums of parts of atoms
 and also above it 	nongenerated situations

In other words we do not really need to impose unrestricted summation and freedom Summation
and freedom can be restricted to hold for the describable part only
 Discussion
Sofar we have been mainly concerned with the question what it takes to get BVA results on adverbial
quantication in a situationbased framework Some of the proposed constraints are relatively unob
jectionable or harmless For instance we have excluded from consideration individual constants for
the sake of simplicity The interpretation of anaphoric relationships 	dynamic binding
 is put aside
because pronouns are judged of no immediate importance for the topics discussed here 	Besides
their 	situationbased boundfree variable or otherwise
 interpretation remains a matter of ongoing
debatecertainly in corelation with 	adverbial
 quantication
 The restriction to Heimian felicity
furthermore is independently motivated 	cf also Dekker 
 The assumption that situation
structures observe the constraints of summation and freedom 	or some suitably restricted variants
thereof
 appears to be intuitively motivated too
The remaining constraints are less unproblematic For instance it remains an open question what
a notion of situationbased negation or adverbially quantication would have to be like to give some
substance to the idea that negated and adverbially quantied formulas too come with some specic
situational content For this purpose maybe structures of situations are needed which resemble those
of Barwise and Perrys situation semantics or Landmans data semantics 	Barwise and Perry 
Landman 
 However like we said above this matter is left open for further research Further
more our unique predication constraint is too peculiar to be intuitively motivated Yet for the very
same reason it is also hard to argue against This issue then will be left here too
The remaining constraints relate to the structure of situations As we have seen uniqueness is
needed to get at least some domain of adverbial quantication and it is related both to the minimality
constraints which come with the SbA as well as to Kratzers persistence requirement Distinctness is
needed to get enough structure on the domain to mimic the BVA As we will argue in the remainder
 Uniqueness and Persistence 

of this paper these constraints are at odds with relatively intuitive conceptions of situations and this
can be taken to mean that the SbA and the BVA are bound to make dierent predictions
If it is indeed undesirable to add the constraints of uniqueness and distinctness to the situation
theoretic framework so if these do need not to be observed it follows that 	quantication over
 the
domains of cases are going to dier from 	quantication over
 the corresponding domains of situations
For this reason we will investigate some cases where the two approaches may be expected to make
dierent predictions The debated constraints here may serve as heuristics for nding such cases As
we will see it will then turn out that as a matter of fact both the BVA and the SbA as they have
been presented in this paper fail in some respects respects Eventually we will argue for a combined
approach which employs a slightly dierent conception of the notion of a situation
	 Uniqueness and Persistence
Is it desirable at all to impose uniqueness on our situationtheoretic models and do we want to preserve
persistence' The real question here is whether we can think of there being more than one 	minimal

situation in which a given tuple of individuals stands in a certain relation and of there being one
minimal situation in which a tuple of individuals does and another in which it doesnt stand in that
relation Clearly this is possible as soon as we take a temporal component into account

For by
a shift in time the truth value of a sentence may shift from true to false and back again and the
stretches or points of time where sentences are true may be adverbially quantied over Consider
	
 John always washes the dishes when Mary is asleep
	
 When John is in bath he always sings
The seemingly singular proposition expressed by John washes the dishes or John is in bath may
be true of dierent situations 	or time intervals
 and these are what the adverb always in these two
examples seems to quantify over This is not really a new observation Adverbs of quantication
have been taken to range over temporal locations 	time points or intervals
 in the rst place and
this idea has been extensively elaborated in among many others Heinamaki  Stump 
van Eynde  Chierchia  de Swart  The point however is that this observation clashes
with uniqueness as it has been formalized above
Paying due attention to the temporal parameter also raises a problem with persistence Apparently
the proposition expressed by John is in bath may be true in some situations 	at some time intervals

and the one expressed by John is not in bath in other ones Now take a situation s in which John
is in bath and a 	later
 one s

in which John isnt What about the sum of these two situations' If s
is in the proposition expressed by John is in bath and s

in that expressed by John is not in bath
then by persistence s( s

would be in both But that should not be
Two solutions to this problem may come to mind The rst which remains closer to the spirit
of Kratzerian situation semantics consists in associating a determinate temporal location with the
propositions expressed by sentences So if s is in the proposition expressed by John is in bath then
somehow the temporal location or temporal trace of s is part of the proposition and similarly for s

and the proposition expressed by John is not in bath The above contradiction is thus avoided since
on this account the sum of s and s

is in the proposition that John is in bath at the time of s and not
in bath at the time of s

 The problem with this solution is that if the propositions involved are so
determinate then they cannot any longer serve to specify nontrivial domains of quantication For
instance example 	
 then would be interpreted as saying something like #when John is in bath at

Which Kratzer explicitly doesnt Time is not a concern in this paper Let us put it aside whenever we can
Kratzer  pp  Kratzer may be fully justied in doing so but as soon as we look at adverbial quantication
we hardly are
 Distinctness 

l he always sings$ for some specic temporal location l 	like yesterday afternoon at a quarter past
four
 Clearly this is not the way to understand that example
The other solution starts from the apparent observation that 	temporal
 adverbial quantiers may
abstract over the moments or intervals of time at which atomic sentences are true so that the de
notations of these sentences must be taken to somehow determine dierent moments or intervals
Now if we want to keep on thinking of sentences as denoting situations then their interpretation
can be related to various verifying instances or moments of time if we acknowledge that situations
have a temporal location or temporal trace as it is also called and if we allow for the possibility
of multitudes of verifying situations Clearly this implies dropping uniquenes and persistence for
that matter Thus for example Sam had a bath can be taken to say that there was a situation in
which Sam had a bath at some stretch of time in the past Sam had a bath ve times can be taken
to say there were ve situations of that kind in that period and Sam didnt have a bath that no such
situation is found there When referring to yesterday the last sentence can be conceived to be veried
by the sumsituation of everything that happened yesterday i Sams having a bath is not part of it 
Under such an analysis clearly Sam didnt have a bath may be veried by the situation yesterday
but not by the larger situation last week 	if for instance he had a bath the day before yesterday

Exit persistence
There are several proposals in the literature for dealing with situations with a temporal dimension
along the lines sketched and in these they are more commonly referred to as eventualities 	among
many others see for instance Bach  Link  Krifka  Landman  Bartsch 

Many of these also share the Davidsonian idea that eventualities or events are not merely parameters of
interpretation but in fact constitute proper arguments of verbs 	cf Davidson  Parsons 

So a verb like sleep can be conceived of as a binary predicate between a class of eventualities called
states and individuals and which holds of a state and an individual i that state is a state of
being asleep of that individual and a verb like sell is thought of as a quaternary relation which
holds between events of selling selling individuals buying individuals and things bought In what
follows we will also adopt this practice 	However we will not delve into the question whether or not
eventualities can be appropriately characterized as 	spatio
temporal locations

To conclude this discussion it may have to be observed that also the BVA will be in need of adopting
predicateinternal eventuality arguments For recall that uniqueness was imposed on SbAmodels for
the purpose of getting BVAresults on adverbs of quantication Now if as we argued there is good
reason not to impose uniqueness on the SbA something in turn will have to be done to the BVA in
order for it not to get its original results and for it to be equally satisfactory as the unconstrained SbA
Clearly by thinking of situations or eventualities as constituting arguments of 	verbal
 predicates this
is in principle dealt with However in that case the issue of the individuation of situations will turn
out to be of acute relevance for the BVA too

 Distinctness
The other constraint to be critically discussed is that of distinctness One of the most striking things is
that distinctness excludes the possibility that two atomic proposition stand in a relation Kratzer 
calls lumping If somebody painted an apple as part of her painting a still life then the proposition
that she painted a still life is said to lump the proposition that she painted an apple Formally a
proposition P is said to lump a proposition Q in a world w i w
 
P and s v w if s
 
P then s
 
Q
If we as we do throughout this paper neglect alternative possible worlds it is easily seen that this
denition amounts to saying that P lumps Q i P is nonempty and P   Q and if we furthermore
assume as Kratzer does that propositions are persistent then P is said to lump Q i P is nonempty
and for every p
 
P
m
there is a q
 
Q
m
 such that q v p Clearly our distinctness constraint excludes
this kind of lumping for two propositions expressed by any two dierent atomic formulas furthermore
freedom helps to exclude it for the propositions expressed by any two logically independent formulas
 Distinctness 

composed from atomic formulas with  and  This is problematic Kratzer develops her situation
theory to analyze counterfactual reasoning and her lumping relation is a key notion in the ensueing
analysis So either we have to give up this notion of lumping 	and the analysis of counterfactuals for
that matter
 or we will have to give up or relativize distinctness
As a matter of fact some form of nondistinctness has constituted one of the motivating reasons
for the development of a situationbased account of adverbial quantication Berman  discusses
the following example
	
 Usually if a letter arrives for me I am at home
Imagine that the reporter of this sentence was always at home when a letter arrived for him say fty
times except this one time when sixty letters were delivered in one package If all the other times the
letters arrived one at a time and if the adverb usually requires us to quantify over particular letter
arrivals then example 	
 would turn to be false However most people are inclined to judge the
sentence true because it is taken to quantify over moments at which or situations in which letters
are delivered The idea is that the situation in which letter a arrives is not dierent from the situation
in which letter b arrives if the arrivals are part of one delivery Observe that this would have been
excluded by distinctness
Similar examples can be made at will
	
 Usually when a building burns down the re was started to collect the insurance
Probably most people will agree that there is a reading of this example obtained by quantifying over
buildings which burn down but it seems the sentence can equally well be read as quantifying over
res irrespective of the number of buildings burning down in these res So if the sentence is about
situations in which buildings burn down and if burnings do not individuate according to the respective
things which burn down then the sentences the house burned down and the barn burned down may be
veried by one and the same minimal event Notice that this is exactly what we wanted distinctness
to exclude
	
 Usually if a maoso enters my restaurant I oer everybody a drink on the house 	before I alarm
the police

	
 	According to Wierengas report
 Only in six cases in which policemen swept down a Beerhalle
the owner succeeded in bribing them
Also in these example it can be argued that what counts are enterings of one or more maosi 	they
usually come with four
 and visits by the police not individual maosi enterings or singular Beerhalle
enterings of members of police teams To be sure suppose two Beerhalle were visited by a team of three
policemen each and that in both cases the owner bribed the police Probably and hopefully people
then judge Wierengas report as not standing in an unproblematic relation with reality Wierenga
might try to back up his report by pointing that six individual policemen were involved in corrumping
Beerhalle raids 	or even six minimal groups of two policemen
 But that wouldnt make example 	

true on its most likely reading
With regard to 	non
distinctness events or eventualities involving multitudes of individuals make
up an interesting topic for further research Suppose that this remarkable pianomover Geesink at
once and on his own carried three pianos upstairs Then consider
	
 Seven times a piano was carried upstairs
	
 Three times a piano was carried upstairs
 Minimality 

	
 A piano was carried upstairs
	
 Three pianos were carried upstairs
	
 Seven pianos were carried upstairs
Apparently examples 	
 and 	
 are not veried by the situation described even though there are
seven distincts sets of pianos each element of each one of which was carried upstairs Example 	

and 	
 on the other hand must count as true whereas example 	
 appears to be false again

Apparently the world is not seen to carve up into three pianolifting events when three piano are
carried up at once
One may of course object that example 	
 must be held false because the phrase n times eectively
quanties over stretches of time and because the three individual events of lifting count as one since
they are cotemporal However it appears to us that the phrases twice and n times can be read in a
nontemporal way for instance when we use Fifteen times a hit to describe a situation in which fteen
people simultaneously re at and hit their respective targets Notice that such a similar splitting up
of one time interval into various lifting events is not at all appropriate for the lifting case described
here
As a conclusion it turns out that it is also undesirable to impose distinctness as a general constraint
and that nondistinctness in fact supplies good motivation for allowing adverbs to quantify over
situations However it must be noticed again that this interest in situations cannot by itself be
held against the BVA For situations have for long been taken to be constituents of the kinds of cases
quantied over according to the BVA and as we said above the BVA subsumes the SbA Moreover for
a proper uniform and adequate treatment of pronouns and of the proportion problem cases 	which may
include situations
 may prove to be indispensable cf eg Chierchia  Dekker  Jager 
 Minimality
Also the constraint of minimality consitutes a heuristics for nding examples which serve to dier
entiate the SbA and the BVA One just has to try to think of sentences which can be predicted not
to have minimal verifying situations and then see how these behave under adverbial quantication
Examples are easily found with the aspectual Vendler classes of states and activities or processes
States in particular and activities or processes to some level of negrainedness are generally argued
to have the subinterval 	or substate or subevent
 property If s is an interval at 	state in
 which
Micky sleeps and s

v s then s

is an interval at 	state in
 which Micky sleeps And if e is an event
of running of Rob then up to some somehow to be specied level of relevance if e

v e then e

is
an event of running of Rob So much seems to be established wisdom in the eld 	cf among many
others Vendler  Dowty  Bach  Link  Krifka  Parsons  Meulen 

Since states and processes hardly can be taken to divide up into natural minimal units they blatantly
conict with our minimality doctrine Yet we do nd adverbial quantication over states and processes
	or processes

	
 Always when John is asleep Mary is awake
	
 When John is walking he usually sings

Maybe except from the viewpoint of a nancial administrator who must count additional charges for each case in
which a piano gets carried upstairs instead of say gets moved by builders hoist Still we think that in that case
the administrator focuses on a stative reading of example  and that he observes that three dierent pianos are in
three dierent perfective states of having been carried upstairs Apparently this is dierent from the reading which
we want to address which focuses on the event of carrying up It may be noticed here that this dierence between a
copula and a passivereading of the item was is marked in Dutch and German Moreover the passive Drie keer werd
er een piano naar boven gedragen is considered plainly false in Dutch in the circumstances described
 Minimality 

Even if there are minimal bits of walk in Johns way of walking and such that every proper part of
them is not any longer to be considered a real Johnwalk still nobody will probably be inclined to
hold that these are what one quanties over with example 	
 Similarly it doesnt seem to make any
good sense to understand example 	
 as quantifying over minimal smallest states of Johns sleep
	Notice also that it would not make any dierence here if we let the quantiers range not over the
states and processes themselves but over the periods of time at which they are realized The problem
with minimality remains entirely the same

But if we do not get an individuated domain to quantify over by looking at minimal parts then
how does the domain of the stative and the processive individuate' How do we carve up the domains
of states and processes in order to quantize them as Krifka calls it' Interestingly one plain answer
to that question is by maximalization! Parsons  Kratzer  Bartsch  and von Fintel
	in a recent eletronic exchange of ndings
 each stress the importance of some notion of maximality
Parsons  p  #We need only add that English usage requires that when we discuss an event
that constitutes a process we usually have in mind a maximal event of its kind so that if someone
asks about Agathas running we assume that the person is mentioning the whole run not one of its
parts$ Kratzer  p  #Likewise we have to make a choice when talking about the facts that
make  Mary is out of town PD true In our case a natural choice are the maximal facts that
make  true If Mary was out of town only once then there is exactly one such maximal fact If she
was out of town several times there are several maximal facts that make  true In this way we end
up with one fact per absence and this is as it should be$ Bartsch  p  points at #      the
fact that we can only quantify over 	nite
 maximal states and processes and not over nonmaximal
ones$ Von Fintel concludes his reections #that there is something fundamentally wrong with the
minimality doctrine       The alternative is to gure out some way of forcing quantiers to quantify
	i
 over objects at the same level of the partwhole hierarchy 	ii
 over maximally uninterrupted
objects$
Interestingly the present observations require us to redo our homework Before we even can make
sense of quantication over maximal states and events we need to be sure they exist at all and not
in a too trivial sense To see again that things dont come for free consider the kind of structures
discussed by Bach and Krifka There we nd a discussion of the property of cumulativity in the
nominal domain and of what Krifka calls summativity in the verbal domain two properties which
involve closures under sums every two parts of water are taken to be water together and the sum
of two events of drinking wine by you is considered a drinking wine by you Now if a state denoting
verb has this closure property then strictly speaking either there will be no maximal state or there
will only be one Of course none of these two individuations corresponds to any intuitive one
Clearly we have to be more specic about maximal states and processes and think of them
as states which constitute coherent wholes for instance as von Fintels maximally uninterrupted
objects We think what we really need are sensible perspectives under which densy 	sub
stuctures
of situations can be seen to individuate A straightforward example of a perspective is a temporal
or a spatiotemporal one Without going into any of the required detail maximal states can be
thought of as those states which have a connected temporal or spatiotemporal location Thus the
temporal location of a number of things can be used to cover distinctions viz between those entities
which 	temporally
 overlap and also to uncover distinctions viz among those which are 	temporally

disjoint More in general a perspective can be thought of as a way of seeing things which guides one
in making some distinctions and neglecting others
There are several ways to go about here 	Cf eg Bartsch  in which verbal predicates are
assumed to come with their own perspectives or principles of individuation as they are called there

However whether it be in these or dierent ways states and processes will have to be mould into some
discrete form before they can be subjected to adverbial quantication Precisely how this happens
what operations are involved and what presuppositions the structures of states and processes must
 Conclusion 

fulll for the operations to be able to work on them at all that is a matter we have to leave for another
occasion
  Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relation between the socalled situationbased and the bound variable
approach to adverbial quantication We have shown what it would take to verify the suggestion that
if the individuation of situations is spelled out adequately then the two approaches converge We have
seen that this requires us to impose three constraints on situation structures viz those here called
uniqueness distinctness and minimality which one as a matter of fact should not want to impose
We have next opted for a shift of the conception of a situation to that of an eventuality and for a
treatment of the adverbs in a dynamic eventbased framework
In a sequel to this paper we would like to investigate techniques to turn 	domains of
 states and
processes into proper subjects of quantication and to cast these in a general theory of adverfbial
quantication in a twosorted 	dynamic
 predicate logical framework Here we want to conclude while
retaining our reserved attitude towards situations and events #for events and states are among the
most problematic ontological categories the identity criteria of which are dicult to apply not just
in a few marginal cases thought up by illmeaning philosophers bent upon showing their ultimate
fragility but in perfectly ordinary runofthemill cases as well$ FraCaS  p  Cats are nice
indeed especially Siamese twin cats
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